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Winners and Losers in the Court of Appeal:  
An empirical study of personal injury cases (2002-16)* 
 
 This article reports findings from an empirical study of 458 personal injury cases decided 
by the Court of Appeal spanning fifteen years. The study used conventional statistical 
software, SPSS Statistics, and two machine learning platforms, Data Robot DQG ,%0ĜV
Watson, to analyse the dataset. The analysis reveals a general pro-Defendant bias within 
the Court of Appeal. Although neither Claimants nor Defendants reverse first instance 
decisions more than 50% of the time, Defendant Appellants reverse more often (47.3%) 
than their Claimant counterparts (39.5%); Defendants also successfully resist more appeals 
and are 20% more likely than Claimants to obtain a favourable outcome in appeals overall. 
These findings are broadly consistent with findings from other studies.  
 However, within a subset of cases involving judges with greater experience of deciding 
personal injury appeals, there is a shift ė albeit slight ė in favour of Claimants. The study 
tested a variety of factors which could potentially explain favourable outcomes in general 
and this pro-Claimant shift in particular. Those factors included the identity of the Appellant, 
the type of case, the type of advocate, the legal issues at stake, and the identities of the 
appeal judges. Controlling for the various factors, the study found that at least one appeal 
judge within the subset delivered pro-Claimant decisions at statistically significant levels. 
None of the other factors contributed to favourable outcomes at statistically significant 
levels.  
 Since a number of potentially pro-Claimant judges retired over the period of the study, 
it might be anticipated that the pro-Defendant bias will intensify. Such a trend is evident 
over the last four years of the study: favourable outcomes for Claimants fell from an average 
of 48% (2002-11) to 37.9% (2012-16) with an absolute low of 26.3% in 2016. Although 
Claimants win less than Defendants, this dramatic fall in the success rate for Claimants is 
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only partly explained by the increasing proportion of Claimant-initiated appeals over the 
last four years. Although that proportion rose from an average of 47.1% to 50% over the 
two intervals, the number of appeals dwindled from 34.2 to 23.2 per annum over the same 
timeframe. On the other hand, pro-Defendant intensification may help explain why the 
number of decided personal injury appeals is dwindling despite the increased proportion 
of such work in the High Court.  
 Whatever the reasons behind the pro-Defendant bias, if ClaimantVĜ legal advisors have 
the (accurate) impression of an intensification of that bias, that impression may well serve 
as a powerful disincentive on them to initiate or resist appeals. And if the average reversal 
rate for any appellant remains or falls significantly below 50%, it is possible that the 
availability of litigation funding for appeals will be compromised.  The combined effect 
could be further reductions in the number of appeals alongside an entrenchment of pro-
Defendant rights within tort law. In the alternative, as the doors to litigation and in particular 
appeals close, litigants might consider using machine learning technology to obtain more 
accurate information about the prospects of success and litigation risk in order to 
compromise appeals on a probabilistic rather than all-or-nothing basis. One possible 
consequence of this approach, however, is that novel claims would never be litigated unless 
litigation funders reassess their requirements of Appellants that the prospects of success 





ęđhe had an impression, but some RIKLVLPSUHVVLRQVDUHLOOXVLRQVĚ.1 




Tort lawyers reading recently reported personal injury appeal cases may have 
been struck by any number of conflicting impressions. Two such impressions are 
that Claimant victories are rare in cases involving RFFXSLHUVĜOLDELOLW\; in other types 
of case some judges habitually deliver pro-Claimant decisions. These impressions 
raise many inter-related questions: is there a significant pro-Defendant bias in some 
types of case or even generally; are some judges unusually partial towards one 
category of litigant over another; can any unusual patterns be detected statistically; 
more broadly, are there factors which act as predictors of the likely outcome in 
cases; if so, what are they? Or, conscious of KahnemanĜVFDXWLRQDU\ZRUGVare our 
impressions here as elsewhere simply products of cognitive illusions ė confirmation 
or availability biases which cause the interested observer to see patterns where 
none in fact exist?  
This article begins to answer some of these questions via quantitative analysis 
of a large sample of personal injury ě3,Ĝcases decided by the Court of Appeal 
between January 2002 and December 2016. The study confirms that both 
impressions are broadly accurate: there is a pro-Defendant ELDV LQ RFFXSLHUVĜ
liability cases, a bias which is particularly pronounced when the Defendant is a 
public body. Further, the pro-Defendant bias can be generalised across most types 
of personal injury cases. However, an analysis of a subset of cases decided by the 
appeal judges with the greatest experience of deciding personal injury-related 
appeals reveals a slightly more favourable picture for Claimants. Within this subset, 
some judges appear to deliver pro-Claimant decisions at statistically significant 
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levels or close thereto. Given that a number of these experienced (and arguably 
more pro-Claimant) judges have left the Court of Appeal, a possible inference 
might be that the general pro-Defendant bias of the Court of Appeal will intensify 
as new personnel are drawn from the less experienced (and arguably more pro-
Defendant) ranks. The study provides some evidence in support of this conclusion. 
Other findings will be of interest. First, the reversal rate for most types of case was 
less than 50% irrespective of which side launched the appeal. This finding could 
have implications for the legal funding of appeals. Second, there is no statistically 
significant advantage gained by employing 4XHHQĜV &RXQVHO ě4&Ĝ LQ SHUVRQDO
injury appeals. However, if junior counsel is acting for a Claimant who is facing a 
Defendant represented by a QC, then such Claimants had the greatest chance of a 
successful outcome, particularly in front of the more experienced judges. Third, and 
tangentially, the number of personal injury cases heard by the Court of Appeal is 
on the decline despite the fact that the proportion of such cases is on the increase 
in the High Court. It is speculated that this may be a function of the pro-Defendant 
intensification of the Court of AppealĜVGHFLVLRQV. 
 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF APPELLATE DECISIONS AND PARTY BIAS  
 




With the H[FHSWLRQRI*RXGNDPSDQG1RODQĜVempirical study of contributory 
negligence in the Court of Appeal,2 recent UK scholarship using quantitative 
PHWKRGVWRDQDO\VHWKDW&RXUWĜVdecisions is scant. There is some older empirical 
scholarship both within and outside the UK that has considered party bias in the 
appellate courts. As Robertson has pointed out,3 so-called ęquant-studiesĚ are 
widespread in the US where empirical analyses of what courts do and why they do 
it have a long tradition. Some US-based journals like Jurimetrics and more recently, 
the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, regularly publish quant-studies about a wide 
range of legal problems.4 In the UK, Burton Atkins studied a large number of Court 
of Appeal cases decided between 1953 and 19ZLWKDYLHZWRWHVWLQJ*DODQWHUĜV
ęparty FDSDELOLW\WKHVLVĚ.5 The party capability thesis claims that the Haves generally 
fare better than the Have-nots in litigation.6  In theory, the Haves are the resource-
rich repeat players such as large companies and state bodies; the Have-nots are 
resource-poor and often one-off players, more often than not individuals. The 
Atkins study was interested in the question whether there was any statistically 
significant difference between the Haves and Have-nots in terms of successful 
reversal rates on appeal, and further whether there was any difference in this regard 
between reported and unreported decisions. He reached two conclusions: the 
Haves enjoyed a more favourable reversal rate than the Have-nots and this success 
rate was even more pronounced in unreported decisions. The differences were 
statistically significant. He therefore argued that unreported cases should be made 
available to all litigants as it might better inform strategic decisions about 
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proceeding with appeals. Since the Atkins study was published, more cases are now 
reported. Outside the context of the Court of Appeal, there has been some 
empirical work considering the House of Lords and Supreme Court most recently 
by Alan Paterson.7 He reports the results of a quantitative analysis of the Law LordsĜ 
voting behaviour, with a particular interest in the voting relationships between 
them. 
 Outside the UK, there are several empirical studies that consider the 
possibility of party advantage. Peter McCormick applied party capability theory to 
appellate success the Supreme Court of Canada between 1949 and 1992 and 
concluded that in the long run, iQWKHFDVHVDQDO\VHGWKHěXQGHUGRJĜ tended 
to lose.8 Stewart and Stuhmcke analysed Australian High Court negligence cases 
between 2000 and 2010.9 They concluded that the pattern of High Court decisions 
was consistent with a move in favour of Defendants even before the 
implementation of Australian tort reform following the Ipp Panel.10 This implied 
that Australian tort reform - in part a response to the Australian version of the so-
called compensation culture - was unnecessary. In the US, there have been many 
quant-studies ranging across a wide variety of topics related to the current study. 
By way of example, Eisenberg and &OHUPRQWĜV  HVVD\ RQ ęPlaintiphobiaĚ,11 
reported finding an anti-Claimant effect resulting from the US Supreme CourtĜV 
summary judgment cases.12 That essay built on similar studies that report pro-
Defendant biases in other US courts.13 (LVHQEHUJ DQG &OHUPRQWĜV statistical 
approach can be traced back to the 1960s when Nagel advocated the adoption of 
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quantitative techniques to test empirical generalisations in legal research.14 Nagel 
also used correlation tools to predict case outcomes in a variety of types of cases.15 
In 1980, he demonstrated the usefulness of statistics for legal policy analysis.16 One 
aspect of the 1980 study related to predicting outcomes in personal injury cases. 
But that study was limited to predicting the likely level of damages as a function 
of medical expenses ė a correlation which seems quite obvious: the higher the 
medical expenses the more likely it is that someone is seriously injured; the more 
seriously injured, the higher the likely level of damages. Other studies have 
attempted to use quantitative analysis to predict the outcome of decisions with 
varying degrees of success.17 The most recent example of this was undertaken by 
Aletras and others who used machine learning to predict the outcome of judicial 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.18 They claim a 79% accuracy 
rate. There is also a tangentially-related descriptive study of winners and losers in 
US defamation litigation conducted by Franklin in the late 1970s.19 One of the 
findings of that study was that Plaintiffs succeeded rarely (5-12% of the time) and 
ęVXIIHUHGDGYHUVHILQDOMXGJPHQWVLQSHUFHQWRIWKHLUDSSHDOVĚ20  
 
II. How is this study different and who might benefit from considering its 
findings? 
 
Although other studies have used quantitative methods to analyse Court of 
Appeal decisions, this study differs from others in terms of scope, object of analysis 
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and boldness of its claims. The Atkins study used all available cases (3167) lodged 
with the Supreme Court library. His study captured the entire population of cases. 
It was broad in scope both in terms of number and appellate subject-matter. The 
instant study does not claim to capture the entire population of PI cases decided 
by Court of Appeal though it captures most of the reported decisions. Furthermore, 
unlike the Atkins study which focused primarily on reversal rates, the present study 
identifies which party had the substantively favourable outcome irrespective of who 
appealed. Like the Atkins study and the Goudkamp and Nolan study,21 the object 
of analysis in the instant study is decisions of the Court of Appeal rather than other 
courts in the judicial hierarchy. However, our reasons for focusing on the Court of 
Appeal may well differ. Aside from the fact that there is no published empirical 
study relating to contemporary Court of Appeal decisions outside the specific area 
of contributory negligence, an assumption of this study is that the Court of Appeal 
is theoretically subject to the doctrine of precedent in a way that the Supreme 
Court is not. As such, the legal rules should in theory play an important part in 
determining outcomes in the Court of Appeal compared with the Supreme Court. 
Of course, some legal rules and doctrines could be described as partisan. For 
example, in the law of negligence, the rules surrounding the imposition of a duty 
of care in novel scenarios (the cases building on Caparo22) are arguably pro-
Defendant; whereas some of the recent rules relating to causation (eg Fairchild23 
and Bailey24) are arguably pro-Claimant. One might therefore expect to observe 
favourable outcomes for Defendants in novel duty cases and favourable outcomes 
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for Claimants in cases turning on causation. But if factors other than partisan rules 
correlate with particular outcomes, this would be a surprising observation especially 
if one such factor is the presence of a particular judge on the appellate panel. This 
may be less surprising in the Supreme Court where there is a relative freedom to 
fashion the law, but it would be less expected in a court which is theoretically more 
restrained by the law. 
The use of quantitative methods and in particular machine learning and/or 
artificial intelligence is gaining increasing traction in our era of big data. It is 
spreading to the law.25 Although this article does not claim that quantitative 
methods can be used to predict the likely outcome in all PI cases, it demonstrates 
a healthy prediction rate ZKLFK FRXOG LQIRUP ODZ\HUVĜ DQG OLWLJDWLRQ IXQGHUVĜ
decisions about the prospects of success in individual cases. This information could 
encourage settlements based on litigation risk which could be calculated quite 
precisely as an algorithm can generate a precise probability of success. The article 
also draws attention to the factors which may act as the strongest predictors of 
likely outcome. ,QVRIDUDVSUHGLFWLRQLVWKHODZ\HUĜVEXVLQHVV,26 then anything that 
sheds light on what a court might do given certain variables is going to be helpful 
to the practising lawyer, the student of law and others. To the extent that this study 
reveals that factors other than legal rules may lead to party bias in some cases, this 
study may also act as a useful reminder to judges of their humanity and the need 
for them to be alert to the potential operation of unconscious cognitive biases in 




III. Clarifying the meaning of party bias 
 
Many practitioners have an intuitive sense of the general distinction between 
Claimants and Defendants as groups of litigants. Firms of solicitors and barristers 
often make their names representing one category or the other. Institutions such 
as the Association of British Insurers and the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers 
are conventionally thought of as respectively Defendant and Claimant 
organisations. In the cases analysed in the study, Claimants are invariably individuals 
who have been injured as a result of anotherĜQHJOLJHQFH Unless they have been 
especially unlucky in life or are fraudsters, they are probably one-off players. They 
may not be resource-poor given the availability of conditional fee arrangements, 
but they are probably risk averse: they probably need their damages more quickly 
than Defendants are prepared to pay them; and they may be inclined to accept 
settlement offers that undervalue their claim.27 When Claimants succeed in court, 
the tenets of corrective justice are arguably achieved as a Defendant is required to 
remedy the injury wrongfully caused. The named Defendant is also often an 
individual. When the Defendant is not an individual but rather a corporate body, 
the Defendant is usually sued because of sRPH LQGLYLGXDOĜV ZURQJGRLQJ DQG
because they invariably have a deeper pocket than the immediate wrongdoer. 
However, in both cases a proven wrongdoer is very rarely found to be personally 
liable.28 This is because any liability is normally discharged by a liability insurer or 
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by the corporate body itself.29 A finding of liability therefore has the distributional 
consequence of spreading the cost of the ClaLPDQWĜVORVVZLGHO\HYHQLIDFRQGLWLRQ
precedent of that loss-spreading is thH 'HIHQGDQWĜV ZURQJIXO EHKDYLRXU. The 
wrongful behaviour does not, however, have any personal consequences for the 
individual Defendant apart from the ignominy of being branded a tortfeasor in a 
court of law. They are blamed but rarely found personally liable. Whether tort 
liability has a deterrent effect on behaviour is a moot point. At best, the deterrent 
effect is marginal.30 This study assumes that most, if not all, judges are aware of 
these facts despite the (ideological) language of individualism and personal 
responsibility that features so prominently in the law of negligence. Thus, for the 
purposes of this discussion, a pro-Defendant bias is taken to mean a pro-institution 
decision, or at the very least an anti-Claimant decision; it could also be seen as a 
pro-Have or anti-Have-not decision in the Galanter sense. Conversely, a pro-
Claimant decision can be seen as a (sympathetic) decision favouring the individual 






The sample was drawn from cases reported on Westlaw. The first search term 
was ęLQMXUĚ.31 This search term was chosen for two reasons. First, it would capture 
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most individuals who had suffered harm in the form of personal injury. This group 
of harmed individuals stood as a proxy for the Claimant category. Second, as 
demonstrated in Figure 1 below, personal injury claims constitute an increasing 
proportion of the workload of the High Court of the Royal Courts of Justice, which 
in turn feeds into the stream of appeals. The initial search was filtered to Court of 
Appeal (Civil Division) decisions in tort law between 1 January 2002 and 31 
December 2016. I chose the start date for two reasons. First, one of the judges that 
had sparked an initial interest in the study was promoted to the Court of Appeal 
in 2002. Second, to extend the range beyond 2002 risked skewing the sample and 
therefore the results of the analysis because the number of reported appeals in PI 
cases has reduced fairly dramatically over the years. Figure 2 demonstrates this 
downward trend. The trend runs in the opposite direction to the trend observed in 
Figure 1. So, whilst the High Court is seeing an increasing proportion of PI cases 
in its workload, the Court of Appeal is seeing a decreasing number of PI-related 
appeals. The end date also SURYLGHVDIXOO\HDUĜVZRUWKRIGDWDDQGWKH15-year 















Figure 1: Annual relative frequency of personal injury and clinical negligence claims 




Figure 2: Annual number of appeals in sampled PI cases with trend line. 
 
I manually screened the resultant sample to determine whether individual cases 
should be excluded from the final sample. Screening involved reading the summary 
Westlaw report of every case and where necessary the official judgment. The target 
cases were appeals in cases involving negligently inflicted PI which resulted in a 
clear win for either the Claimant or the Defendant. The reason for targeting non-
intentional tort cases is that liability in such cases is normally discharged by proxies 
for the Defendant category: an insurer or a corporate body. This is not invariably 
the position in intentional tort cases. Similarly, cases not involving personal injury 
as the gist of the action could dilute the Claimant category. Cases involving 
intentional torts, carriage by air, economic loss cases (including Part 20 claims for 








2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
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these issues were subsidiary to a main PI-related issue. Five cases were removed 
from the sample because it was not easy to identify a clear winner from the 
contents of the official report.33 A further category of case was also removed: road 
traffic accidents between two or more cars. In this type of case it is often a matter 
of chance which party issues proceedings first, particularly where both parties are 
injured. In this situation, the distinction between a Claimant and Defendant 
becomes largely meaningless. This sort of case accounted for approximately 10% 
of the final sample.  
There are 458 cases in the final sample. They were classified into categorical 
variables: which party appealed, the type of case, what broad legal issues were 
involved on appeal, the nature of the injury, the type of advocate representing each 
party, the identity of the judges on the appellate panel, the identity of any 
dissenting judge, whether the appeal resulted in a reversal, and whether the 
outcome was favourable for the Claimant or Defendant. There are sixteen 
categories for type of case (reflected in Table 3 below), fourteen for type of legal 
issue,34 and five for type of legal representation.35 Except for type of injury, all this 
information was coded and recorded in Excel and input into SPSS Statistics. Data 
was also input into two machine learning platforms: some early data collected for 
this study was input into Data Robot36 and the final sample was input into IBM 
Watson.37 Both platforms aim to identify the factors which can act as predictors or 




ii. Selection Bias 
 
Some limitations about this type of exploratory study ought to be 
acknowledged. Those limitations can be classified under the heading of potential 
bias. For example, Clermont and Eisenberg have cautioned against only using win 
rates as an object of analysis. Their caution stems from the operation of the 
selection effect bias. This bias entails inter alia that observed cases are unlikely to 
UHIOHFWWKHęPDVVRIXQGHUO\LQJGLVSXWHVĚ38 because of the much larger number of 
cases that settle. This bias is undeniable if the UHVHDUFKHUĜVconcern is to understand 
the legal system as a whole. However, the more limited scope of this study was to 
focus on how Court of Appeal judges vote in the cases they decide. The main 
reason for focusing on voting behaviour rather than, for example, content analysis 
of judicial opinions is summarized in *ROGPDQĜVlegal realist KXQFKWKDWęđYRWHVLQ
specific cases - what judges actually do - are more important in revealing their 
attitudes and values than are the rationalisations they provide in their written 
opinions telling us why WKH\YRWHGDVWKH\GLGĚ39 This focus also takes seriously 
+HUPDQ2OLSKDQWĜVFODLPIURPWKDWęQRWWKHMXGJHVĜRSLQLRQVEXWZKLFKZD\
they decide cases will be the dominant subject matter of any truly scientific study 
RIODZĚ40  
A selection bias was also suggested by Atkins.41 He adverted to the selection 
bias caused by reported cases. His finding that the pro-Defendant bias was even 
more acute in unreported cases implies a distorting effect caused by the absence 
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of those unreported cases if they cannot be included in the sample. However, many 
more cases are reported now than was in the case in 1992. Therefore, a significant 
bias caused by unreported cases is now less likely. Additionally, as is generally 
recommended in the literature,42 the coding adopted has not been subjected to a 
reliability check by another coder.  
ANALYSIS 
 
i. Reversal and favourable outcome rates: Defendant advantage 
 
We have seen that earlier studies confirm a pro-Defendant bias in different 
areas of law and across jurisdictions. This is so whether we look at reversal or 
outcome rates. The distinction between the two is that the reversal rate measures 
how frequently Appellants overturn a ORZHUFRXUWĜVGHFLVLRQZKHUHDVWKHfavourable 
outcome rate includes how often any party successfully appeals (ie reverses) or 
UHVLVWVWKHRWKHUVLGHĜVDSSHDO)RUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKHDQDO\VLVWKHUHYHUVDOUDWe 
included twenty-three cases of partial successes. However, when measuring 
favourable outcomes, the analysis only included clear wins for either party.43 
Although we are mainly interested in the favourable outcome rate, the study 
confirms a Defendant advantage in terms of reversal rates. However, the reversal 
rate across the board would not look promising to a litigation funder. Crucially, 
neither Claimants nor Defendants reverse more than 50% of the time: Claimant 
Appellants reversed the loZHU FRXUWĜV GHFLVLRQ LQ % of their appeals,44 
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Defendant Appellants reversed 47.3% of theirs.45 There is some variability between 
types of case, but the combined reversal rate is only 44.3%.46 This implies that over 
the long term any appellant is more likely to lose than win their own appeal. Given 
that litigation funders usually require a probability of success of more than 50% as 
a precondition for continued funding, it may strike some as surprising that so many 
PI cases reach the Court of Appeal in the first place. This insight may also explain 
why the overall number of appeals is falling. That said, the 44.3% reversal rate in 
the sample is substantially higher than the average 35% reversal rate identified by 
Atkins between 1952 and 1983.47 The elevated reversal rate in the sample is borne 
out by official statistics. Judicial Statistics48 state an average reversal rate of 39.5% 
for appeals from the QXHHQĜVBench DLYLVLRQě4%'ĜRIWKH+LJK&RXUWDQG% 
for appeals from the County Court between 2008 and 2016. If the figures are 
combined to take into account that there are more appeals from the County Court 
than the High Court, then as demonstrated in Table 1 below, the combined average 




2008 109 142 251 43.4
2009 92 99 191 48.2
2010 132 123 255 51.8
2011 110 129 239 46.0
2012 108 136 244 44.3
2013 96 122 218 44.0
2014 82 121 203 40.4
2015 53 107 160 33.1
2016 52 85 137 38.0
834 1064 1898 43.9Total
Year Allowed Dismissed Total Reversal	Rate
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Table 1: Outcome of appeals from County Court and QBD of the High Court to the Court of 
Appeal (Civil Division) 2008-16. Source: Judicial Statistics.49 
 
The reversal rate drawn from Judicial Statistics includes all appeals from both the 
QBD50 and County Court51 and therefore encompass more than just PI cases. 
Nevertheless, the combined data evidences a declining reversal rate which is 
mirrored in the sample data. The closeness of the average reversal rate, its 
downward trend and the fact that a large majority of the population of PI cases 
was captured during sampling implies that the final sample is reasonably 
representative of the population of cases. 
What happens when we focus on outcomes instead? Logically, the favourable 
outcome rate is higher than the reversal rate because it includes those cases where 
a party has successfully resisted an appeal. The Defendant advantage persists, but 
Defendants can now claim that their chances of a favourable outcome in the long 
run are over 50%. As noted in Table 2 below, Claimants had favourable outcomes 
in 45.4% of their cases including cross-appeals whereas Defendants were successful 
in the other 54.6%. When cross-appeals are excluded, there is a commensurate 
drop in success rates, particularly for Claimants, where the success rate falls to a 
mere 37.4%. The Defendant success rate also fails to reach 50%, although at 49.1% 
Defendants are about a third more likely than Claimants to emerge as the winner. 
This difference has not been tested for statistical significance on the basis that the 
samples may not be truly independent. However, the general message seems to 
be that prospects of success are generally better for Respondents than Appellants, 
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EXW &ODLPDQWVĜ FKDQFHV LPSURYH VLJQLILFDQWO\ ZKHQ WKHUH LV D FURVV-appeal ė 
particularly where it involves contributory negligence. 
 
Table 2: Successful outcome rate as a function of identity of the Appellant, including cross-
appeals. 
 
As Table 3 below demonstrates, there is some variability in success rate depending 
on the category of case, yet Claimants only have a more than evens chance of a 
favourable outcome in three categories: Claimant cyclists (66.7%), public liability 
ě3/ĜQRQ-RFFXSLHUVĜ cases involving public body Defendants (61.5%) and in clinical 
negligence cases (52.9%). Conversely, Claimants were least VXFFHVVIXOLQRFFXSLHUVĜ
liability ě2/AĜ cases against public bodies (26.7%), although their success rate 
increased markedly (to 41.7%) against private Defendants in OLA cases.  
 
Claimant Defendant Cross-Appeal
Claimant 82	(37.4%) 112	(50.9%) 14		(73.7%) 208	(45.4%)
Defendant 137	(62.6%) 108	(49.1%) 5	(26.3%) 250	(54.6%)








Table 3: Categories of non-intentional personal injury cases appealed between 1 January 
2002 ė 31 December 2016 with relative frequencies, favourable outcomes and success rate 
for Claimants. *Collisions between cars have been excluded for the reasons explained above. 
 
One effect of using multiple categories is that the individual sample sizes become 
quite small. This is particularly relevant to &ODLPDQWVĜVXFFHVVHVLQWKHF\FOLVWDQG3/
(non-OLA) categories and their failures in OLA cases against public bodies. 
Nevertheless, the picture presented by Table 3 is clearly one of a general pro-
Defendant advantage. These findings also confirm the impression that since 2002 
at least, public body Defendants seem to have benefitted from strong legal 
protection in OLA cases compared with other types of case.  Whether that 
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protection has become stronger since Tomlinson v Congleton BC52 (the case 
involving a teenage boy who dived into shallow water in a former quarry, broke his 
neck and attempted to sue the Council owner occupier) remains an open question. 
 
ii. Explaining the bias statistically 
 
The question then arises whether it is possible to identify any factors which may 
explain the pro-Defendant bias. This is where quantitative research methods 
become especially useful. A central aim of much quantitative research is to uncover 
statistical relationships between independent and dependent variables. The 
independent variables are the potential causes of the dependent (or proposed 
outcome) variable. In this study, the overall winner variable was the dependent 
variable requiring an explanation by the other potentially explanatory independent 
variables. All the variables in this study are nominal categorical variables ie variables 
that fall into distinct categories where order is unimportant. The appropriate 
statistical test for independence of association between categorical independent 
and dependent variables is the Chi-square test. So, by way of example, running 
that test in SPSS53 on Type of Case (as per Table 3) and Overall Winner reveals no 
statistically significant relationship between them. The test could be run on all the 
variables in turn, but machine learning platforms speed up this process 
considerably.54 Both Data Robot and Watson revealed surprising candidates as 
potential drivers of outcomes. Although both platforms indicated that the identity 
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of the Appellant was a driver of the likely outcome, they also implied that the 
identity of the judges hearing the appeals was of greater significance in some cases. 
Watson suggested that the combination of the second and most senior judges (in 
that order) on an appellate panel was the strongest driver of outcome, with a 
predictive strength of 63%. Data Robot, which processed an incomplete sample of 
cases, suggested similar drivers of the overall winner: the second most senior judge, 
followed by the most senior and finally the junior judge were more important 
drivers of the winner category than the identity of the Appellant, the type of case, 
the nature of legal representation or the legal issues at stake in the appeal. In 
reality, it is a combination of factors which will produce a particular outcome. But 
Data Robot claims to be capable of discovering the best algorithm for predicting 
outcomes based on all the variables used in a dataset. Whilst I had access to the 
Data Robot platform, I ran 'DWD5RERWĜV final algorithm on a fresh sample of 49 
cases. 'DWD5RERWĜV algorithm predicted the correct outcome in 35 of them. This is 
a success rate of 71.4%, which although not as impressive as the 79% success rate 
claimed by Aletras et al, it is probably better than many ODZ\HUVĜEHVWguess in cases 
that go to appeal; it is almost certainly more precise. This level of predictive 
accuracy may help explain why elite law firms are turning to artificial intelligence, 
including machine learning, to improve efficiency even if the final decision on 
whether to litigate or pursue an appeal is probably still made by a human being.  
The machine learning platforms suggested that the identity of the Appellant 
was a predictor of outcomes. Quite simply, being a Claimant or a Defendant was 
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associated with a particular outcome. SPSS Statistics confirmed a statistically 
significant association between identity of Appellant and outcome (p = 0.01);55 and 
we can simply look at Table 2 to observe big differences in success rates depending 
on who is appealing. However, this does not tell us why being a Claimant or 
Defendant Appellant should make a difference to the outcome. This is where 
statistical analysis can help untangle which factors are likely to be playing 
meaningful roles in the outcome. The appropriate test to use in this context is 
binary logistic regression.56 This test allows the researcher to test whether particular 
variables are associated with a particular outcome at statistically significant levels 
whilst controlling for other variables. Regression tests revealed no statistically 
significant relationship between the type of case, legal representation or main legal 
issue and outcome (although if the main issue related to quantum of damage, it 
came close to statistical significance). Given the number of judges in the sample, 
the regression analysis could not test for an association between judges and 
outcome although the Chi-square test revealed a statistically significant relationship 
between the most senior judge on the panel and the outcome (p = 0.04).  
In summary, according to SPSS the variables which were most significantly 
associated with particular outcomes were whether the Appellant was a Claimant or 
a Defendant and the identity of the most senior judge on the appellate panel. 
When the Appellant was the Defendant, and not controlling for any other factor, 
that Appellant was 4.68 more likely to obtain a favourable outcome than a Claimant 
Appellant. To test whether the presence of a particular judge on the appellate panel 
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is associated with a particular outcome, the data set was restructured57 so that 
WKHUHZDVDVHSDUDWHUHFRUGIRUHDFKMXGJHĜVYRWH. The result of the Chi-square test 
as applied to the whole sample revealed a statistically significant association (p = 
0.05). However, a majority of the 133 judges in the sample had sat on five or less 
panels.58 This renders the Chi-square test unreliable. It would be possible to run 
the test on all judges with experience of more than five PI panels, but a more 
accurate picture of individual voting behaviour is arguably obtained by considering 
judges with experience of more panels. For that reason, a subset of more 
experienced judges in this type of case was taken. Of the 133 judges, 20 had sat 
on twenty or more panels and between them, they were responsible for 624 votes, 
or 47.3% of all the votes cast. Table 4 below VHWVRXWWKRVHMXGJHVĜSUR-Claimant 
and pro-Defendant votes. 
 
No. % No.	 %
1 25 10 40.0 15 60.0
4 27 8 29.6 19 70.4
5 28 12 42.9 16 57.1
9 50 22 44.0 28 56.0
31 20 8 40.0 12 60.0
32 34 9 26.5 25 73.5
33 27 19 70.4 8 29.6
38 60 40 66.7 20 33.3
39 24 12 50.0 12 50.0
40 37 26 70.3 11 29.7
43 50 30 60.0 20 40.0
47 30 20 66.7 10 33.3
53 20 10 50.0 10 50.0
62 34 15 44.1 19 55.9
68 27 14 51.9 13 48.1
69 22 13 59.1 9 40.9
72 37 16 43.2 21 56.8
75 24 12 50.0 12 50.0
83 24 6 25.0 18 75.0
91 24 9 37.5 15 62.5





Table 4: Observed pro-Claimant and pro-Defendant votes of all judges sitting on 20 or more 
appellate panels taking into account dissenting votes. 
 
The Chi-square test statistic on this subset of judges confirmed a strong statistically 
significant relationship between the identity of the judge and the outcome (p < 
0.001), an even stronger association between judges and outcome than had been 
the case across the full sample. And this despite the fact that all the other variables 
were now in most cases being counted more than once following restructuring of 
the dataset.  
Although a Chi-square test can only alert a researcher to there being an issue 
that should be investigated further, and cannot by itself indicate the direction of 
any relationship, each individual judge has a voting record which could be indicative 
of their personal tendency. What Table 4 reveals is that there are a number of 
judges in this subset who delivered pro-Claimant decisions at a much higher rate 
than the average (eg Judges 33, 38, 40, 43, 47 and 69). Conversely, there are also 
some high pro-Defendant rates (eg Judges 1, 4, 31, 83, 91 and especially 32). 
Overall the ClaimantVĜ VXFFHVV rate in the subset of cases was slightly higher at 
46.1%59 than the 45.4% success rate in the full sample. Although this is a very small 
difference (and probably cannot be tested for statistical significance as it would 
violate one of the assumptions of the z-test), one potential explanation for the 
difference could be that a number of the more experienced judges are more pro-
Claimant in their voting behaviour than the less experienced judges. This point 
seems supported by the increased proportion of pro-Claimant votes amongst the 
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more experienced judges (49.8% of the votes cast). Given that inexperience of 
appellate panels logically entails smaller sample sizes, the study did not test that 
hypothesis directly; but it tested whether there is any statistically significant 
relationship between the identity of the more experienced judges and outcome 
whilst controlling for other factors. It did this using logistic regression.60  
The results of the logistic regression revealed that at least one appellate judge 
delivered pro-Claimant decisions at levels that were statistically significant. This 
finding may in part explain why the Claimant success rate overall has improved 
slightly in front of the more experienced judges. The regression test applied to the 
judges and outcome whilst controlling for identity of Appellant continued to 
demonstrate a statistical relevance of being a Claimant or Defendant. However, the 
presence of Judge 40 on an appellate panel was associated with a 184% increase 
in obtaining a pro-Claimant outcome (p = 0.037). Two other judges (33 and 38) 
came close to delivering pro-Claimant decisions at statistically significant rates (with 
respective p values of 0.052 and 0.055). When adding in and controlling for the 
type of case, the presence of Judge 40 on the bench continued to be associated 
with pro-Claimant outcomes (p = 0.036). Judge 33 remained close to statistical 
significance (p = 0.056) and Judge 47 was pulled into the picture (p = 0.051) being 
associated with a 189% increased likelihood of a pro-Claimant outcome. When 
adding in and controlling for the type of legal representation, only Judge 40 
remained pro-Claimant at statistically significant levels (p = 0.034) with the chances 
of a pro-Claimant outcome increasing to 200%.  Finally, when adding in and 
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FRQWUROOLQJIRUWKHPDLQOHJDOLVVXH-XGJHĜVSUR-Claimant stance was no longer 
statistically significant although it remained close (p = 0.07); but the presence of 
Judge 33 on an appellate panel was now associated with a 283% increase in pro-
Claimant decisions (p = 0.021). Judge 47 was close to being pro-Claimant at 
statistically significant levels (p = 0.055) with a 200% increase in the chance of a 
pro-Claimant outcome. Once all the variables were included, the identity of the 
Appellant ceased to be associated with a particular outcome at statistically 
significant levels but the type of case and main legal issue could be so associated: 
if the cases involved either OLA claims against private defendants or claims under 
the Highways Act then the odds generally strongly favour Defendants whereas if 
the main legal issue involves breach of statutory duty, causation, damages or a 
IDFWXDOHYLGHQWLDO LVVXH WKHQ WKH RGGV VZLQJ LQ WKH &ODLPDQWVĜ IDYRXU %XW once 
again, it is difficult to be precise in this context due to double counting of these 
variables.  
Five of the six initially earmarked pro-Claimant judges retired from the Court of 
Appeal before the end of 2016: one in 2010, two in 2011 and another two in 2013. 
If there is an association between particular experienced judges on appellate panels 
and pro-Claimant outcomes, then if a number of the pro-Claimant judges have left 
the Court, it might be expected that pro-Claimant will have reduced 
commensurably. Such a trend appears to be confirmed by the study. Figure 3 below 
sets out the proportion of Claimant Appellants between 2002 and 2016 in 
comparison with the overall success rate for Claimants over the same timeframe. 
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The proportion of Claimant appellants reached peaks of 57.9% in 2014 and 2016. 
Those peaks also seem to be inversely proportional to pro-Claimant outcomes at 
31.6% and 26.3% respectively. Conversely in 2005 and 2015, when the proportion 
of Claimant appellants fell to about 30%, their overall success rate was at least 50%. 
In only two years did Claimants have favourable outcomes in excess of 50% (55.2% 




Figure 3: Proportions of Claimant Appellants compared with proportionate overall success for 
Claimants 2002-16. 
 
If we consider the cases decided since the end of 2011 until the end of 2016, some 
116 cases, the favourable outcome rate for Claimants dropped to 37.9% on average 
with a low of 26.3% in 2016. Over that timeframe, Claimants were Appellants 50% 













ten years when the average favourable outcome rate for Claimants was 48%. As 
Claimants were Appellants in 47.1% of the cases between 2002 and the end of 
2011, there seems to be a negative relationship between being a Claimant 
Appellant and favourable outcomes. But the size of the fall in the favourable 
outcome rate for Claimants is much larger than the proportionate increase in 
Claimant-initiated appeals. As demonstrated in Figure 2 earlier, the number of 
appeals has fallen significantly in recent years. These observations tend to confirm 
the argument presented here that factors other than the identity of the Appellant 
per se are strong drivers of outcomes. Whether the anti-Claimant trend will 
continue remains to be seen as personnel in the Court of Appeal continues to 
change.  But given that the new personnel are drawn from a pool of judges that, 
on average, is slightly more pro-Defendant than the more experienced pro-
Claimant judges they replace, then unless greater experience of appellate panels in 
3,FDVHVDXJPHQWVDQLQGLYLGXDOMXGJHĜVSUR-Claimant leanings it is likely that the 
pro-Defendant bias will further intensify. 
Just as Edwards and Elliott61 have cautioned against the use of numbers to 
prove unfounded judicial bias, it could be suggested that factors other than party 
leanings of judges explain the distribution of decisions. It is not denied that there 
are other factors at play, but this study suggests that some contenders are not 
statistically significant. One of the points relied on by Edwards and Elliott was the 
notion that Defendants tend to take more ěarguableĜ points on appeal.  Whether 




clear. But the argument runs something like this: because repeat players in this type 
of litigation tend to be Defendants, they have a greater influence on which types 
of case are appealed (those being the ones they feel more confident in winning 
and which in turn they win); these favourable decisions then EHFRPHęHPEHGGHG
in the substance of legal rights.Ě62 The logic of this argument, then, is that it is the 
law, the legal rights or rules, which determine any bias. However, this explanation 
would not account for any pro-Claimant bias observed in some judges. And if there 
is an observed pro-Claimant bias which is independent of legal rights, then there 
is reason to think that whatever explains the pro-Claimant bias in some judges ė 
be they cognitive, cultural or personal biases, some of which are unavoidable ė also 
explains any observed pro-Defendant biases. Furthermore, and by way of example, 
quantitative analysis of the sample cases did not reveal any statistically significant 
association between the quality of legal representation and outcomes. A very crude 
measure of the quality of legal representation is whether a party employed a QC 
or not. Using that measure, Table 5 below sets out the number of favourable 
outcomes in the full sample as a function of the quality of legal representation. 
Although that Table reveals that Claimants have proportionately more positive 
outcomes when represented by junior counsel facing a Defendant represented by 







Table 5: Pro-Claimant and pro-Defendant outcomes as a function of the quality of legal 
representation in whole sample. 
 
However, when we analyse the subset of cases and count votes rather than 
favourable RXWFRPHVWKHQWKHGLVWULEXWLRQZLWKLQWKHęORVLQJSDUW\RQO\ZLWK4&Ě
category becomes very different. Table 6 below shows that when junior counsel 
represents Claimants against Defendants who are represented by a QC, the 
Claimant share of the votes reaches 67.6%. The equivalent proportion of votes, 
taking into account dissents and absent judges for that category of case within the 
full sample is only 50.4%.63 
 
Table 6: Pro-Claimant and Pro-Defendant votes taking into account any dissenting votes. 
 
Pro	Claimant Pro	Defendant
Neither	party	with	QC 83	(41.9%) 115	(58.1%) 198
Both	parties	with	QC 68	(46.9%) 77	(53.1%) 145
Winning	party	only	with	QC 29	(46.0%) 34	(54.0%) 63
Losing	party	only	with	QC 27	(52.9%) 24	(47.1%) 51





Neither	party	with	QC 123	(47.9%) 134	(52.1%) 257
Both	parties	with	QC 95	(44.8%) 117	(55.2%) 212
Winning	party	only	with	QC 44	(50.6%) 43	(49.4%) 87
Losing	party	only	with	QC 46	(67.6%) 22	(32.4%) 68






The logistic regression test implied no significant relationship between the type of 
legal representation and outcome. Nevertheless, the Table reveals that in the subset 
cases Claimants seem to benefit from unequal playing fields in front of the more 
experienced judges. If some judges are by inclination pro-Claimant, then this makes 
sense because such judges may feel that the odds are even more unfairly stacked 
against risk averse, one-off litigants facing a resource-rich Defendant able to 
employ the services of a highly-paid silk. In this situation, the pro-
Claimant/underdog or anti-institutional bias arguably becomes especially marked 
and may therefore provide a partial explanation for this striking observation.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH & CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 With the help of quantitative methods, this article has begun to answer some 
of the questions raised by the distribution of outcomes in personal injury decisions 
delivered by the Court of Appeal. But the research also leads to new questions 
which could be amenable to quantitative analysis. For example, have public bodies 
received better legal protection since the House of Lords decision in Tomlinson v 
Congleton BC?64 Is the Court of Appeal in fact becoming increasingly pro-
Defendant as predicted here, or are the last four years an aberration? Is the pattern 
of outcomes different when potentially pro-Claimant judges sit on the same panel 
as potentially pro-Defendant judges or if judges have to explain their decision by 
giving a reasoned judgment? Does a MXGJHĜVH[SHULHQFHRIVLWWLQJRQSHUVRQDOLQMXU\
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appeals make any difference to their voting record over time? What other factors 
might be relevant predictors of outcome: the type of injury, the type of Claimant 
(in terms of their race, gender, age or profession) or a more specific category of 
Defendant beyond the public-private dichotomy used here. Additional factual 
variables could easily be crunched by machine learning platforms such as Data 
Robot and Watson to reveal hitherto unobserved patterns. And if the accuracy of 
prediction rates begins to exceed 80% based on just a few variables, then the more 
interesting question becomes when and why does the computer get it ęwrongĚ; are 
novel cases the casualties of machine learning because the algorithm will be 
unfamiliar with the novel variables? Perhaps it is in these instances that the added 
value of the human lawyer comes to the fore. There are other questions which are 
less prone to quantitative analysis such as what does it really mean to be pro-
Claimant or pro-Defendant? Is this a function of judicial attitudes towards risk and 
its distribution and allocation in society? Do judicial attitudes about the so-called 
ęFRPSHQVDWLRQFXOWXUHĚKDYHDQLPSDFWRQRXWFRPHV"Could cognitive biases (to 
which all humans, including judges, are subject) account for some of the observed 
party biases? Can fluctuating judicial attitudes about judicial comity explain 
fluctuations in the reversal rate? Or is the return to the historic norm of 35% simply 
a function of current legal policy to keep disputes out of the court room? Some of 
these sorts of questions could be analysed statistically if judges would be prepared 
to answer survey questions. But judicial willingness to participate might be found 
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wanting if researchers told judges (as they ethically should) that the survey was 
testing for amongst other things the possibility of judicial bias.     
Quantitative analysis can go a long way towards distinguishing between justified 
and unjustified impressions about the winners and losers in the Court of Appeal. 
This article has also suggested potential practical uses for machine learning in the 
business of assessing and settling cases. The study echoes earlier findings 
demonstrating a general pro-Defendant bias at appellate level. Defendant 
Appellants have better reversal and outcome rates than Claimants and are 
approximately 20% more likely to have a successful outcome irrespective of who 
appeals. Although neither Claimants nor Defendants can claim a reversal rate 
exceeding 50% - a matter which will be of interest to litigation funders and others 
ė until recently the average reversal rate of 44.3% has nevertheless been higher 
than it has been historically (35%). However, as Table 1 demonstrates, the reversal 
rate over the last two years of the study (35.5%) fell back towards the historical 
average.  Whether this low reversal rate represents a return to an historical norm 
and/or an unstated policy to discourage litigants from using courts, or is only a 
temporary correction remains to be seen.  
Despite the observed pro-Defendant bias, it also appears that over the period 
of the study some judges with greater experience of determining personal injury 
appeals may have been delivering pro-Claimant decisions at statistically significant 
rates. 7KLVILQGLQJPD\DFWDVDUHPLQGHUWRSUDFWLWLRQHUVRIDGDJHWRęNQRZWK\
EHQFKĚ EHIRUH HPEDUNLQJ RQ VXEPLVVLRQV OHW DORQH SURFHHGLQJ ZLWK D case. 
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However, when controlling for the identity of the Appellant, type of case, the main 
legal issue and the type of legal representation, only one judge of the twenty 
analysed fell into this category. Of course, this is an observation that could be put 
down to chance: you might expect to see such a distribution of decisions 5% of 
the time. And having one pro-Claimant judge in the Court of Appeal is scant 
consolation for Claimants who now experience successful outcomes less than 40% 
of the time. However, the fact that the mere presence of particular judges on an 
appellate panel might be associated with significantly increased chances of success 
for either party merits further investigation even if there are other things going on.  
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